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ComrrumlarylOaks[ord & Chatcr: Pn~ds ()[ Baycsirm RflliorwZUy
principle. that P(qlp) remains the same when com[mted on an
enlarged space. '1'his is the only way in which one can gllarantee
that enlargements of the prohahility space in the limit lead to a
coherent prohahility distrilmtion - the starting point of Bayesian
rationality.
(2) An'nrthodox Bayesian alternative wOllld he a constmction
in which the prohahiÍity spaces remain the same (namely. the
ILIliversal space hased on all possihle propositions). Imt the prohahility distrilmtions change. In ollr toy world. the prohahility
space is in hoth cases {p, q, r}. hllt one COI lid aSSllme that the
probabílily distribution Hrst assigns probabílity O to nol-r. anrl.
Ilpon hecoming aware of the seconrl conrlitional "if r then q," a
nonzero prohahility. '1'he trollhle with sllch a sllggestion is that
from a Bayesian point of view. the transition from the a priori
prohahility P(nol-r)=O to the a posteriori P(llol-r) > O is not
allowerL hecallse this cannot he achieverl \'la CBaCo): conrlitionalizing on more e\'lrlence cannot make a nllll prohahility positive.
One tlllls neerls an arlrlitional rationality principie (heyonrl
[BaCo]) governing sllch transitions. In the ahsence of sllch a
principie. one has to assllme that the prohahilities of all nonsalient exceptions (SlLch as nol-r) are initially very small Imt
nonzero. '1'his increases the complttational complexity of prohahílistic reasoning enormollsly: One rerjlures massh'e storage
anrl intricate complltations to maintain consistency of the prohahílity assignment.
'1'hese consirlerations show that in orrler to accollnt for the rlata
on the sllppression task any prohahilistic morlel needs to he Sllpplementerl with a theory ahollt nonmonotonic and non-Bayesian.
Imt stíll somehow rational. changes in rlegrees ofhelief One may
then qllestion whether a prohahilistic morlel is necessaryat all:
Stenning amI mn Lamhalgen (2005: 2008a) pro\"lrle a morld
cast entirely in terms of nonmonotonic logic.
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Abstraet: Oaksfon[ & Chatpf (O&C) focm on pattprns oftypicaJ at!llJt
rpasoning from a prohahilistic pprsppctivP. \Vp discllsS implications of
pxtpnding tJ¡P prohahiJistic approach to Jifpspan t!p\P]opmpnt,
considpring thp rolp 01' \Vorking mpmory, stratpgy llSP, and pxpPrtisP.
Exphtining nuiations in 1111111an reasoning posPs a challengP tú Bayp.sian
ration~J analysis as it fpqllirps intpgrating knowlpdgp ahollt cognitivp
processps.
j

Bayesian rationality highlights the remarkahle sllccesses rather
than faillll"es of hllman reasoning hy recasting seemingly erroneolls reasoning in logical tasks Ilsing a prohahilistic approach.
However, in their hook Bay{,,~ian Ralionalily (Oaksforrl &
Chater 2007, henceforth BR). Oaksford & Chater (0&(;) rlraw
a rather static pictlll'e of hllman reasoning hy focllsing on
typical patterns of responses from arllllts. \Ve propose a more
rlynamic perspeetive, whieh eonsiders that reasoning systematieally varies within inrlividllals over the lifespan (Howe & Rahinowltz 1996; Markovits & BalTOIullet 2002) and hetween
inrllvidllals with rllflúent levds of knowledge and expertise
(Ericsson et al. 2006). Althollgh O&C acknowledge the impOltance of co nsidering reaso ni ng data on inrll vid Ital diflúe nces
(BR, p. 288) and on information proeessing eapaeities (p. 290),

do not ackquate1y 8ceount for how variat.ion inBuences a
Bayesian rational analysis of reasoning. Anderson (l991a) and
others have pointed Ollt that perhaps the major potentiallinütation. the "Adülles heel," of rational analysis wOllld he eoml)l[tational constraints that are too complex or arhitrary. \Ve arglle
that Olll' 'ltlrlerstanrling ofthe meehanisms of ehange in reasoning
ean hdp IlS specify comp'ltational limitations for prohahilistie
modeling and assess whether a single model ean captlll'e the
complexities of reasoning.
'vtany impOltant aspects of eognition change over the lif'espan.
amI reasoning is no exeeption (Baltes et al. 1999). Aecorrling
to Piaget, hoth logieal reasoning and prohahilistic reasoning
emerge fl-om adoleseenee to yOllng adlllthood at the lüghest
stage of coglütive development (Piaget & Inhelder 1975).
Subsequent resf,awh, howevm', has qualified these Hndings,
showing that yOllnger düldre n Iltldersta nd as pects of s Ilch rmsoning (Falk & Wilke,üng 1998: Galotti et al. 1997). Flllthermore.
reasoning contülIles to de\'elop rllll'ing arllllthood with perform:Hlce in spedfic domaíns írwreasing as individuals gain reasoning
knowledge and expeltise (Eriesson & Lehmann 1996: Sternherg
1999). Yet, overall aeross the adlllt lifespan. ahstraet reasolüng
(measllred hy intelligenee tests) dedines with age (Verhaeghen
& SalthOllse 1997). '1'lllls. rmsoning is a rlynamic aspeet of coglütion that varies with age and experience and res IIltS from the interplay of hiologieal proeesses (e.g., hrain matlll'ation) and
enellltlll'ation (e.g .. edlleation) (Baltes et al. 1999).
A developmental perspective may inform Bayesian rational
analysis hy specif~'ing comp'ltationallinütations of the coglütive
system. An impOltant limitation faced hy the 11llman eogniti\'e
system is working memOly capaeity - a key rleterminant of
reasoning performanee (Kyllonen & Christal 1990). Like other
coglütive eapacities. working memory systematically ehanges
aeross the lif'espan hy steadily inereasing dlll'ing childhood
(Conlin et al. 2005) and declilüng aeross adlllthood (Verhaeghen
& Salthollse 1997). \Vorking memory. therefore, poses a dynamie
eonstraint on the rational analysis of reasOlüng.
Althollgh O&C are clllTently silent on the role of de\'elopmental changes in working memory amI reasoning. they do note that
inrllvidllals with lügher working memory capaeities tend to
exlühit more logieal reasOlüng. '1'0 illllstrate. in the \Vason selection task. a SIlhgrollp ofindi\'ldllals (ca. 10 'k ) consistently chooses
the logieally eorreet comhination of carrls, inrlicating that
althollgh most seem to adopt a prohahilistic model, others
dearly do not. O&C sllggest that tlüs variation in hehavior primarily rd10cts ddiueratíve strategy use and edneational (training) rllfl'erences. wlüeh are "not inrllcative of inrllvidllal
rliflerences in the natlll'e of the fllndamental principies of
hllman reasoning" (BR. p. 288). This daim seems prohlematie
gh'en what we know ahollt the interplay hetween strategy Ilse.
trailüng. anrI hasie coglütive mechanisms. Of eOlll'se. coglütive
capaeities can eonstrain the strategies tllat people Ilse:
ho\v,"ver, spel'ific strategy us," and training may shape the basic
eognith'e meehanisms, as welL Diflerenees in memory strategies
(e.g .. rehearsal, dlllnking) ean also alter hasic mechalüsms of
working memory eapacity anrl its rdationship to eogniti\'e performance (Cokdy et aL 2006). In adrlltion. hoth eJ\.-tensive practice with sp.::dHe strategies and the aequisition uf knowledge
anrI expeltise dramatieally expand working memOly (Eriesson
& Kintseh 1995). lndeed, as training ehanges ddiherative strategies to alltomatie proeesses, the eOltex ean Ilndergo fllnctional
nellroanatomieal reorganization (Diek et al. 2006). '1'Illls, it is
possible that delibel'8:Uve scrategy use and training may influence
reasoning preeisdy hecau,~e they alter Ilnderlying cognitive
mechanisms sllch as wOl'king memory. Given the eomplex
rdationship hetween strategies. training., and eognitive meehanisms, it seems prematlll'e to dismiss individllal diH'erenees in
strategy Ilse as not flltldamental to reasoning. A eomprehensive
modd of hllman reasoning nlllst aeeollllt for tllese difl'erenees.
Variation in human reasoning has proven diffi.eu]t to eapture
for prohahilistie modds (Sllllltz 2007)., althOllgh recent researeh
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has made some progress applying prohahilistic models to individIlal diflprences (e.g .. category learning: :\lavarro et al. 2006) amI
cognitive development (e.g .. callsalreasoning: Sohel et al. 2004).
This work represents a step in the right direction: however. we
expect that no single modd can prerlict reasoning performance
eqllally well across age grollpS and le\'els of experience.
1ndeerl, system atic variations in peoples' h eh avi or s Ilggest that
severa! diH(,rent models (or modifications of a given mode])
may he rerl'úred to explain rleveloping hehavior (SlllLltz 2007).
:\levertheless, investigating diflúences hetween the models
across age grollps and skill le\'els may help IlS to Ilnrlerstanrl
more exactly '\vhat rliflers" hetween amI "what rle\'elops"
witlün individllalS.
In dosing, we mllst emphasize O&C's comment that prohahilistic morlels are often onlv flUlctionallevel tlleories that shollld
not he confllserl with ' algoritlmüc le\·d theories (process
modds). Brighton anrl Gigerenzer (2008) have pointerl Oltt in
their rliscllssion of the linüts of Bayesian models of coglütion
that the rJllestion ofwhythe lllLman nünd does what it does (fIUlCtionallevel) cannot he separated from the qllestion of how the
hllman nünrl rloes it (algoritllnüc level). Therefore, it is cmcial
that flltme Bayesian rational analyses specif~r how exactly their
fIUlctionalle\'el morlds constrain theorizing ahOllt cogtütive processes. Tlüs iSSlle is especially relevant as the data connecting
rlevelopment, expertise, working memory, amI reasOlüng imply
that m Illtiple strategies (anrl therefore p rocesses) are at play.
Thollgh Bayesian rationality seems to provirle a flltlctionallevel
accolUlt of prototYVical adlllt reasoning, tlle development of cogtüth'e capacities anrl expertise remains Ilnrlerappreciated.
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Abstraet: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning i~ e'ú'mplif10d
by t]¡P inl"nrlllatinn g,lin Illoclpl I"nr thp \Vasnn canl splpctinn task.
Althnllgh thp Illndd is plpgant ami nrigiruJ, sP\pml kpy asppcts nI" t]¡P
Illndf'l warrant tilrt]lPr (liscllssinn, particlllarly t]lOSf' cnncf'rning t]lf'
scnpp nI" t]¡P task ami t]¡f' chnicp proCf'SS nI" indú"idmJs.

In the hook Baljl'sian Ralimw/itlj (Oaksforrl & Chater 2007. hencefortll BR)., Oaksford & Chater (O&C) present a sllmmary anrl a
synthesis of tlleir work on hllman reasoning. The altthors arglle
that formal logic anrl rlerlllC'tion rlo not explain how people
reason in evervday situations. The deflciendes 01' the most
simple forms of logic are ohviollS when one consirlers that they
may assign "tl'lle" to ahsllrrl statements sllC'h as "if tlle moon is
bhw, than eows eat flsh" (BR, p. 70). ~v1ore impOltantly, the
alltllOrs propose that, in contrast to formallogic, prohahility calcllllls rloes provirle the right tools for an analysis of llllman
reasoning. TllllS, the allthors arglle that people solve rlerlllC'tive
tasks hy inrlllC'tive methorls. From this perspeetive, llllman
reasoning can he characterizerl as Bayesian 01' rational.
Consirler tlle \Vason carrl sdection task rliscllsserl in Chapter
6. Palticipants are confl'Onterl with fOllr carrls., showing an A., a
K, a 2, anrI a í. Palticipants are tolrl that each carrI has a tlllmher
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on one side and a letter on the other. They are given a mle, "if
there is an A on one side. then tllere is a 2 on the otller side."
amI sllhseel'lently. have to select tllOse cards tllat need to he
tlll"ned over to assess whether tlle mle holds tme or noto A
momenfs thO'lght reveals that the cards that need to he tlll"nerl
m'er are the A can! and the 7 can!. Yet, tlle majority ofpalticipants
rlo not choose tlle 7 can!. 1mt tend to choose the 2 canI instearl.
O&C propose an elegant Bayesian model - tlle information
gain model - to accolUlt for people's performance in the
\Vason task. According to the morlel, people select the carrls
lhal reduce tlleir eA-p ecled uncertainty fue most. 5peciHc
assllmptions ahollt tlle rarity of tlle information on the carrls
lead to the condllsion tllat selection of the 2 card nüght he
rational after all.
The information gain model has heen sllhjected to intense
scmtiny (e.g., Oheraller et al. 1999). For non-expelts, the
detalls of thís ruscussion are somewhat difHcwt to f611ow.
A Ilsdlll g,úrleline is tllat a modd shollld only he ahanrloned
when it can he replaced with sometlüng hetter. And - criticisms
raised against tlle information gain model notwithstanding1 have not come across a model that does a hetter joh explaining
how people make tlleir card selections.
Despite its simplicity anrl elegance, some impOltant rletails of
the information gain morlel were not dear to me. First. O&C
arglle, on page 210, that their accollnt only holds if palticipants
regard the cards as a sample from a larger poplllation. Perhaps
the allthors cOllld spell Ollt tlüs argllment in a hit more detail.
Taldng probabílit.y as a rdlection of degree of belief, J die!. not
immerliatdy see what calclllations are in neerl of adjllstment.
Seconrl, the allthors mention that palticipants who realize that
the cards are nol samplerl from a larger pO[lIllation wOlllrl
alwavs choose the A card and the 7 carel. 1 do not know
vdwther thh predictíoll has becn testcd cmpirieally but 1 Hnd
it unly slightly more plausible than eows eating Hsh. Note that
in the \Vason task a SIlhstantial proportion of participants do
not eve n s elect the A carr!.
Another isslle that warrants doser exanünation is the way the
model's preelictions relate to the data. In the information' gain
modeL each card redllces the expected ILtlCeltaint y to some
exient. \Vhy then does an individllal palticipant not select all
fOil!" carrls, 1mt generally only selects one or two') In otller
words, it was IltlClear to me how the morld, from a consideration
of expecterlllnceltainty redllction, can prerlict canI selections for
an individllal participant.
A fOluth point concerns the role ofitlllividllal eliHúences. As the
alltllOrs disCllSS on page 211, a SlLhgrollp of Ilndergrad'late stlldents
witlllügh intelligence (ahollt 10%) rlo sdec1 the A canI anrl the 7
carrl. This reslllt strengthened my initial helid tllat a motimter!.
intelligent person wOllld always choose the A anrl 7 cards, when
given snffieknt tirnf'. In the spiJit. of falsiHeation, 1 then tested
this assllmption on a colleag'le, who of COILl"Se immediately
seketed the A and 2 cards. h,rhaps Shf' was not sufficíently motivated to tlünk the prohlem thro'lgh careftJly - WOlUrl incentives of
time or money increase the sdection of the 7 carrP
O&C are t~ he arlnürerl for their principled approach to qllantitative morleling, anrl for tlleir cOlll"age to take on the Ilnassailahle
rlogma of hll man irrationality. lt is Ilnfortllnate tllat nllLch of the
material in the hook was alrearly availahle dsewhere (e.g .., Oaksforrl & Chater 2001; 2003h); therdore, it was not entirdv clear
to me what the hook arlrls to 0111" ClllTent knowlerlge hase. '
One linal eomment. It strikes me as paradoxical that research··
ers who arglle fOl" a coherent, rational approach to hllman reasoning then pl'Oceerl to apply an incoherent, irrational appl'Oach to
the statistical analysis of their experi me ntal rlata. Thl'OllgllO Ilt
the h ook, the allthors re nOI LIlce Popper' s stance o n tlle im pOltance of falsilication, arguing that thís ís not how scienee works,
nor how people reason. Bllt tllen, in the very same WOl"k, the
alltllOrs measllre tlle valirlity of their morlds hy means of pvallles, anrl indllrle statements SIlC'h as "the morld COlurl not he
rejecterl." Why'?

